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STATUTORY STREAM POLLUTION CONTROL
On May 3, 1854, a special committee reported to Philadelphia's city
council that it was fully satisfied with the "extraordinary quality" of the
water of the Schuylkill River and that filtration for water supply purposes
was unnecessary.' In the following years municipalities and industries discharged their wastes into this river and others like it with little consideration for treatment, in effect turning vital water supply sources into open
sewers. Coal washings and other polluting materials choked the Schuylkill
to such an extent that a costly reclamation program resulted, by September,
2
1951, in the removal of more than 18,000,000 cubic yards of silt, while
progress in the abatement of sewage pollution was just beginning. Even as
reclamation of this sort is undertaken, new problems continually arise.
The Delaware River basin, for example, is the scene of an expansion of
industry with the migration of mammoth steel mills to that area. The
waste treatment problem so created is enormous,3 and without proper control the resulting pollution would dwarf that of the Schuylkill. These
situations represent examples of a serious problem throughout Pennsylvania and the nation. On a national scale it is estimated that there are now
twenty thousand sources of pollution, both municipal and industrial, and
that the cost of constructing necessary treatment facilities will reach eight
4
or nine billion dollars.
Despite the known extent of pollution, it may still be urged that this
is merely a "fish problem," that the drive for clean streams is entirely
in the hands of sportsmen. This may have been the traditional view of
industries using rivers for waste disposal, but such is not always the case
today. Vast quantities of clean water are essential not only for public water
supply needs but also in many manufacturing processes-65,000 gallons to
produce a ton of steel, 320,000 gallons to produce a ton of synthetic rubber.5
The increasing demands of industry and the public for adequate supplies
of pure water must be weighed against the financial burden of waste treatment. Industry, municipal governments, and the public are coming to
realize that the balance is weighted heavily on the side of clean streams.
1.

BAxER, THE QUEST For PURE WATER

145 (1948).

2. Figure supplied by Pa. Dept. of Forests and Waters, September 14, 1951.
3. The United States Steel Co. reports that 230,000,000 gallons of water will be
used daily by its new Fairless works at Morrisville, Pa., but that it will be returned
to the Delaware "cleaner than it was on entering the mill." Phila. Evening Bulletin.
March 10, 1951, p. 20, col. 5.
4. See 58 CHEmIcAL ENGINEERING 112 (1951); Business Week, May 12, 1951,
p. 96.
5. Business Week, May 12, 1951, p. 96. See also Phila. Inquirer, Sept. 21, 1951,
p. 13, col. 8, as to the industrial water supply problem on the lower Delaware River.
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To remedy the evil of polluted water with minimum financial burdens,
programs have been undertaken at state, interstate, and national levels coordinating legal abatement procedures with comprehensive plans of reclamation. Using the highly industrialized and populous state of Pennsylvania
as an example, it is the purpose of this note to analyze the various legal
measures available in forcing abatement of pollution, to evaluate the employment of those measures, and to demonstrate the problems of municipalities, industries, and the public in meeting their obligations. The scope
is here limited to pollution, and no attempt is made to delve into the related
problem of adequacy of water resources and the need for conservation.

THE NATURE AND CURE OF POLLUTION
Types of Pollution-The present Pennsylvania pollution control law,
the Act of 1937,6 defines pollution as "noxious and deleterious substances
rendering unclean the waters of the Commonwealth. . . ." 7 More technically, there are three basic types of pollution which must be prevented
if river water is to be preserved in a relatively pure condition. The first of
these, a major problem in Pennsylvania in the form of coal washings, is
"physical pollution," consisting of suspended solids creating turbidity in
water.8 Presence of substances such as salts, acids, organic compounds,
and phenols which cause undesirable chemical effects is known as "chemical
pollution" 9 and may have serious effects on industrial users of water by
way of corrosion. Both mining and steel processing create corrosive acids;
and as will appear below, acid mine drainage has long been and continues
to be Pennsylvania's most perplexing pollution problem. Finally, certain
sources of contamination, particularly sewage, contain pathological bacteria,
creating "bacterial pollution." 10 The pollution in any one stream will, of
course, be a complex and even varying combination of these. But whatever
its nature, the greatest single danger is the effect on public water supply.
In addition to increasing costs of purification, an overloading of water
treatment facilities can result ultimately in the passage of intestinal organisms which, together with pollution of bathing and shell fish areas, may
cause epidemics of typhoid and other intestinal diseases..'
Treatment-The threat presented by pollution cannot be met by a mere
legal prohibition. Water which has been contaminated by use will find
its way back to streams whether by man-made conduits or natural flow.
Where the amount of contamination is slight and population sparse, a river
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.1 et seq. (Purdon, 1949).
7. Id., § 691.1.
8. See 67 CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 893 (1950).

9. Id. at 893-4.
10. Id. at 894.
11. See RuDOLPHS, PRINCIPLES OF SEWAGE TREATMENT 13 (3d ed. 1950).

Where

water treatment and distribution facilities are working properly there is little danger.
But in one instance where bacteria entered distribution lines there were 3000 cases
of dysentery in a community of 11,000. 34 Am. Joua. PUBLIC HEALTH 948 (1944).
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may stabilize itself by a process of self-purification. 12 Such natural stream
sanitation is of little significance in our highly concentrated society today
other than to account for variations in the degree of pollution along the
course of a river. The approach of the law must therefore be to require
facilities so located and constructed as to prevent the polluting materials
from reaching streams without purification. Of necessity every such treatment plant must be different to the extent of meeting a particular pollution
problem. Briefly, complete treatment will involve varied combinations of
mechanical and hydraulic separation, chemical coagulation and precipitation, and biological reaction.'" The first step in a given case is determination of the degree of treatment required, and thus of the nature of the waste
disposal plant. Under a court order to abate pollution, the offender is left
in the position of planning complete treatment or taking the calculated risk
that less thorough facilities will satisfy the court. Actually such complete
treatment is normally not essential; and under administrative control, which
has largely supplanted the use of individual court orders, technical standards of treatment are normally established in acordance with the enforcement agency's overall plan.
Though in some cases a well conceived plant will produce by-products
of economic value, 14 a complex and costly project will in all cases confront
the municipality or industry under an order to abate pollution. Some aspects of the financial problem are discussed below, but first the legal
measures employed to force abatement will be explored.
FAILURE OF COmOON LAW ENFORCEMENT

In view of firmly implanted rules of property law, the extent of stream
pollution existing today at first seems hard to understand. There can be
little doubt that Pennsylvania courts have recognized generally accepted
doctrines, yet the result has not been protection of riparian owners or the
public in general.
Riparian Rights-Often repeated by the courts has been the doctrine
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas-the admonition to use one's property
in such a manner as not to injure that of another. The riparian proprietor
has no ownership of running water,'5 though he does have the right to
use all that is needed for ordinary domestic purposes, even to the extent
of complete consumption.' 0 Subject to such use by the upper owner, the
12. See RUDOLPHS, supra note 11, at 39.
13. See generally IMHOFF AND FAro, SEWAGE TREATMENT 1 (1940) ; 67 CHEmICAL
INDUSTRIES 895-6 (1950).
14. See IMHOFF AND FAIR, op. cit. supra note 13, at 9. Dried sludge fertilizer

from the Los Angeles Hyperion treatment plant is expected to return $700,000 a year,
The American City, July, 1949, p. 93. Some industrial wastes also yield valuable
products; e.g., Schenley Industries sells treated distillery wastes as livestock feed;
see Business Week, May 7, 1949, p. 31.
15. See Phila. & Reading R. Co. v. Pottsville Water Co., 182 Pa. 418, 423, 33 AtI.
404, 405 (1897).
16. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Miller, 112 Pa. 34, 3 At. 780 (1886).
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lower riparian owner has a right to have the water pass his property without material diminution in quantity or corruption in quality. 17 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has talked of a right of "natural flow" and "natural condition"; 18 no "sensible or essential" interference; 19 and "reasonable
use" judged with regard to public 'onvenience and general good; 20 but
has always arrived at the same conclusion, that appropriation or pollution
of running water is actionable if sufficient to cause injury to lower riparian
owners. Unless, however, the public has acquired rights for water supply,
or unless there is a statute involved, the injury is one of which only a
21
riparian owner may complain at law.
Additional rights to use and pollute water may be obtained by prescription, a grant of rights by the injured parties being presumed where
the particular use has been adverse, continued, exclusive, and with knowledge and acquiescence of those affected for twenty-one years. 22 The rights
so acquired are measured by the enjoyment and therefore may not be increased by an expanding industry or the like.23 In any event the practical
importance of prescriptive rights to pollute running water is not great today,
since there can be no prescription against the public,24 and most major
sources of pollution fall into the category of public nuisance.
The injury caused by violation of the rights of a riparian owner is a
trespass, and by its very nature in most cases a continuing trespass.25 As
such, the measure of damages, seemingly assuming future abatement of
the nuisance without equity enforcement, has been held to be the cost of
restoring the damaged area of the stream to its former condition unless
such cost exceeds the value of the damaged riparian land, in which case that
value becomes the limit of damages. 26 Pollution by others is not a defense,2 7 nor is the availability of other sources of pure water.28 The right
of the riparian owner injured by the actions of those upstream is, in brief,
to be restored to the full enjoyment of his own property.2 9
17. McCallum v. Germantown Water Co., 54 Pa. 40 (1867); see Wheatley v.
Chrisman, 24 Pa. 298, 302 (1855).
18. See Fricke v. Quinn, 188 Pa. 474, 482, 41 Atl. 737, 738 (1898).
19. See Clark v. Pennsylvania R.R., 145 Pa. 438, 449, 22 Atl. 989, 990 (1891).
20. See Howell v. McCoy, 3 Rawle 255, 269 (Pa. 1832).
21. Commonwealth v. Blue Mountain Stone Co., 9 Pa. D. & C. 455 (C.P. York
1926).
22. Messinger's Appeal, 109 Pa. 285, 4 At. 162 (1885) ; Hoy v. Sterrett, 2 Watts
327 (Pa. 1834).
23. McCallum v. Germantown Water Co., 54 Pa. 40 (1867); see Warren v.
Hunter, 1 Phila. 414 (C.P. 1853).
24. See Commonwealth ex reL. Atty. Gen. v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,
50 Pa. D. & C. 411 (C.P. Phila. 1943).
25. E.g., Hileman v. Hileman, 172 Pa. 323, 33 Atl. 576 (1896).
26. Stevenson v. Ebervale Coal Co., 203 Pa. 316, 52 Atl. 201 (1902) ; Lentz v.
Carnegie Bros. & Co., 145. Pa. 612, 23 Atl. 219 (1892).
27. See Norristown Woolen Co. v. Taubel, 19 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 66, 72 (C.P.
1901).
28. Stevenson v. Ebervale Coal Co., 203 Pa. 316, 52 Atl. 201 (1902).
29. Wheatley v. Chrisman, 24 Pa. 298 (1855).
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Equity Enforcement-In view of the continuing nature of sources of
contamination, the remedy of an action at law is of little value in eliminating the condition on any long range basis. As a result of this inadequacy
of the trespass action, an injunction may issue on behalf of a private person
to enforce his riparian rights.30 But defenses which would not protect the
defendant at law may weigh heavily in equity. The existence of pollution
from other sources, the absence of "irreparable" injury to the plaintiff,
the danger that an injunction may force discontinuance of an industry, all
may bar relief.3 ' Equity will balance the interests of the parties involved,
and if it is found that any benefit to the plaintiff by abatement will be disproportionate in relation to the injury to the defendant's operations, there
is little hope of an injunction on behalf of the sole riparian owner. It may
even be found that there is "no remedy",3 2 i.e., no economically practical
remedy for a specific factual situation.
Though an individual may find it difficult to obtain equity enforcement of his riparian rights, the public, acting through its elected officials,
stands a greater chance of relief. Where the pollution creates a public
nuisance, and in view of water supply needs such is usually the case, the
interests of the public are normally held superior to the interests of private
persons or industry, and the pollution is enjoined.33 Failure to seek enforcement of such remedies may well be the major cause of the condition
of our streams today. For example, the city of Philadelphia filed suit in
1896 to prevent pollution of the Schuylkill by coal mines. The bill was retained in 1907 with liberty to apply for such order as required, yet the city
waited until 1943 to file a petition, only to find that the relief sought was
not within the terms of the 1907 decree.34 It would appear that concerted
efforts by public agencies over the past century within the existing framework of equitable relief could have avoided many of today's stream pollution
problems. Equity could well have forced the installation of treatment facilities to meet the threat to public health had this aspect of pollution and the
feasibility of constructing waste disposal plants been as forcibly impressed
upon the courts as was the argument of certain industries that they would
have to shut down were they not permitted to dispose of their wastes as
they saw fit.
The Use of Streams as Sewers-While the municipalities of Pennsylvania have been lax in seeking protection for their citizens from pollution
by others, they themselves have contributed a major share of contamination
30. E.g., Wanamaker v. Benson, 63 Pa. Super. 401 (1916) ; Rennekamp v. Goldberg, 54 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 61 (C.P. 1936).
31. See Norristown Woolen Co. v. Taubel, 19 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 66 (C.P.
1901).
32. E.g., West Penn Water Co. v. Sunnyhill Coal Co., 93 Pittsburgh L.J. 541
(C.P. Allegheny 1945).
33. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,
50 Pa. D. & C. 411 (C.P. Phila. 1943).
34. Commonwealth ex rel. McCormick v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 347
Pa. 602, 33 A.2d 19 (1943).
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in the form of raw sewage. As late as 1890 equity enjoined a city from
building a sewer which would drain into a stream flowing through a
citizen's property.3 5 In another case an injunction was refused, but with
the implication that an action at law would be successful.3 6 Nevertheless
it became firmly established that a municipality had full power to adopt
a stream as a sewer,3 7 the only limitation being a duty to keep the channel
open and remove obstructions and accumulations of filth.38 The attitude
of major Pennsylvania cities, reluctant to make any investment in sewage
treatment, has been to rely fully on this questionable doctrine and pollute
rivers at will. Philadelphia had completed plans for a treatment system
by 1915, yet no concerted effort was made to carry the plans into realization until the current clean-streams program. Excuses of wars and depression have been convenient, but the basic reason for failure of our cities
to take action on sewage disposal seems to have been the absence of any
forces pushing them toward the goal.
The Problem of Coal--The Sanderson Case-The reputedly leading
case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson39 involved the destruction of
fish and trees and the contamination of the plaintiff's water supply by discharge of acid mine drainage. After the case had been before the supreme
court four times it was held that any injury was damrnm absque injuria.
This was an action at law for trespass, yet in reaching its conclusion the
court applied such equitable reasoning as fear of the consequences to the
operation of mines throughout the state should recovery be allowed here.
Undoubtedly the case had the effect of discouraging many proponents of
clean streams; but any belief that it gave the green light to pollution in
general is a misconception of the holding, for the case itself provides the
limitations which make it doubtful authority in any field other than acid
mine drainage. Following dictum in the opinion, courts have rejected its
result where public use of water was involved, 40 where the source of pollution was not "natural development of the land," 41 and where artificial
means of draining mines to a different watershed have been employed.4
Nevertheless, the case has been followed as fundamental law as to acid
35. Martin v. Philadelphia, 26 W.N.C. 120 (C.P. Phila. 1890).
36. Reading Iron Works v. South Chester, 2 Del. Co. 455 (C.P. 1885).
37. E.g., Blizzard v. -Danville, 175 Pa. 479, 34 AtI. 846 (1896).
38. Owens v. Lancaster, 182 Pa. 257, 33 Ati. 858 (1897) ; Yeager v. Pittsburgh,
103 Pa. Super. 34, 157 AtI. 353 (1931).
39. 113 Pa. 126, 6 Atl. 453 (1886). See also prior litigation of this case in 102
Pa. 370 (1883) ; 94 Pa. 302 (1880) ; 86 Pa. 401 (1878).
40. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 Atl. 386 (1924);
Roaring Creek Water Co. v. Anthracite Coal Co., 215 Pa. 115, 61 At. 811 (1905)
Commonwealth ex rel. & Butler Water Co. v. Hanratty, 60 Pittsburgh L.J. 13 (C.P.
Butler 1909).
41. Rarick v. Smith, 5 Pa. Dist. 530 (C.P. Schuylkill 1896) ; cf. Robb v. Carnegie
Bros & Co., 145 Pa. 324, 22 At. 649 (1891).
42. McCune v. Pittsburgh & Baltimore Coal Co., 238 Pa. 83, 85 Atl. 1102
(1913); Williams v. Union Improvement Co., 1 Pa. Dist. 288 (C.P. Luzerne 1892).
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mine drainage, 43 and even extended to waste pumped from a limestone
quarry. 44 In keeping with the limitations of the case, pollution from the
deposit of solid coal wastes, known as culm, has not received the same protection as acid drainage. The operator has no right to throw culm into
streams or leave it where ordinary rains or floods will carry it into the
water.45
Vast accumulations of culm which have been dredged into desilting
basins along the Schuylkill River provide ample evidence that common law
and equitable'remedies have been of little effect against discharge of solid
coal wastes. The same unfortunate result applies equally to other sources
of pollution, both industrial and municipal. The reasons for this situation
cannot be traced to the Sanderson case or even to rights acquired by prescription for, as already shown, public interest is paramount to both of
these bars. Pennsylvania saw a flurry of cases between 1885 and 1900
which established the doctrines set forth here. The next forty years passed
with little strenuous effort to enforce those rights. Public and official
apathy, misconceptions of the Sanderson holding, and largely unfounded
fears of hindering the great industrial and urban development of the period,
appear to be at the basis of the failure of Pennsylvania to preserve the
natural resources represented by its running waters. The existing law
provided a basis on which a clean streams program could have been put
into effect, yet no one saw fit to force the issue until the last decade.
STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT
The inadequacy of common law enforcement in preserving clean
streams may be assumed to be quite general, for today all but three states
46
have adopted some sort of general statutory control to prevent pollution.
Not only in Pennsylvania, but throughout the nation, however, this interest
in pollution abatement is a relatively recent development. Twenty-three
of the control laws have been passed since 1941, while only four existed
47
prior to 1910.
While these statutes, in general, merely reaffirm common law rights
and obligations, they do create new methods of enforcement, and any increase in the effectiveness of pollution control will rest in the efficiency
of these new enforcement programs. The general scheme is similar in
nearly all cases: the creation of a state administrative agency with the power
to make rules and regulations and enforce them by court action.48 In
43. See Mountain Water Supply Co. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 3 Pa. D. & C. 187,
205 (C.P. Fayette 1922). This case, at 232, contends that any treatment is the duty
of the water company receiving the impure water.
44. Freas v. Cox Lime and Stone Co., 29 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 109 (C.P. 1912).
45. Hindson v. Markle, 171 Pa. 138, 33 Atl. 74 (1895) ; Elder v. Lykens Valley
Coal Co., 157 Pa. 490, 27 Atl. 545 (1893).
46. Arizona, Idaho, and Utah, non-industrial states, seem to lack such statutes.
Alabama was included in this group in 1948, 44 CHEM. ENG. PRaoGREss 4, but has since
adopted a statutory program, ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 140(1) et seq. (Supp. 1949).
47. See 44 CHEM. ENG. PRoGREss 5 (1948).
48. For a tabular analysis of statutory provisions see ibid.
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keeping with the general recommendation of engineering authorities, the
statutes themselves in all but a few cases make no attempt to establish
exact treatment standards but leave wide discretion to the controlling
agency.49 Thus, in practice, only six states have dogmatically required
treatment of all wastes. 50 The discussion of the present Pennsylvania
statute here deals with provisions which to a greater or lesser extent are
representative of nearly all state acts, the variations being mostly in powers
given the boards, and the essential factor in all cases being the enthusiasm
of administrative action.
Statutory regulation of pollution in Pennsylvania began with the Act
of 1905."' This enactment was limited to the problem of sewage, and
though containing an apparent prohibition against its discharge, 52 did not
apply to existing facilities,53 or even new sewers if a proper permit were
obtained. 4 All private sewage was excepted unless found injurious to
public health, 55 and there was no mention of industrial wastes other than
an explicit exception of waters from mines and tanneries. 56 An Act of
1923 gave the Department of Health power to issue orders for the protection of water sources approved by the Department for public supply. 7
Despite provisions for enforcement by fines, waters already polluted by
industrial wastes were again specifically exempted, as were all mine discharges.
It is clear that neither of these statutes could be effective in preventing
an ever-increasing pollution of the Commonwealth's streams; in fact they
bear the appearance of legislative approval of acts unlawful under the
common law, such as unrestricted discharge of industrial wastes. It was
not until passage of the Act of 1937 58 that any real attempt was made to
remedy existing disgraceful conditions and afford protection for the future.
It is this Act, as amended in 1945, 5 to which municipalities and industries
alike must now look to determine their responsibilities above and beyond
the long-ignored duties of the common law. Administration of the Act
is in the hands of the Sanitary Water Board of the Department of Health,
and it is the task of this agency more than any other single group to carry
out a program designed to bring an end to pollution of Pennsylvania's
streams.
49. Id. at 6.
50. Id. at 15.
51. Act of 1905, April 2?, P.L. 182.
52. Id., § 4.
53. Ibid.
54. Id., §5.
55. Id., §8.
56. Id., §4.
57. Act of 1923, June 14, P.L. 311.
58. PA. STAT. AxN. tit. 35, § 691.1 et seq. (Purdon, 1949).
59. Act of 1945, May 8, P.L. 435. The amendments were limited to the article
on industrial wastes, and reflect more stringent enforcement in this field.
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Municipal Sanitation-The current statute, like its predecessors, contains a general prohibition against the discharge of sewage into the waters
of the Commonwealth.60 For the first time, however, municipalities with
existing sewerage systems are faced with a mandate to discontinue the discharge of raw sewage, 61 within such time as the Sanitary Water Board may
order. 2 Failure to comply with such an order by completion of a prescribed treatment system has, in at least one case, resulted in a mandatory
injunction to meet the Board's requirements.6
That the statute alone
is no absolute guarantee against sewage pollution, however, is shown by
exceptions for discharge into streams impregnated with acid coal drainage 64
and discharge in accordance with permits which may be issued by the
Board.6 The effectiveness of the present campaign to eliminate pollution
depends, therefore, not so much on the provisions of the statute or the
enforcement accorded by the courts as on the administrative policies and
decisions of the Sanitary Water Board. Enforcement was lax, largely
due to war conditions, until 1944 when the Board, at a series of ten hearings, presented its basic policy-that all sewage must be treated to at least
a primary degree, with such additional treatment as will be necessary in
individual cases. 66 For several years orders of the Board did not call
for more than the preparation of plans, but beginning with the Delaware
watershed in 1949, most have called for the immediate construction of
treatment plants.0 7 Thus 564 municipalities have received orders to abate
pollution or submit plans, and 162 orders to construct plants have been
issued, a single order in some cases including a number of adjacent communities.
Were conditions normal, one could predict that under present policies
few municipalities in the Commonwealth could long avoid installation of
the required facilities. A state of national emergency, however, points up
the flexibility of the method of enforcement chosen by the legislature. While
the Act prohibits pollution, it is the Board which must determine when and
how the generalities of the statute are to be invoked against the wrongdoer.
Despite apparent enthusiasm on the part of the Board to see its overall program expedited, pleas of delay by reason of labor and material shortages
will once again be determinative in the application of the provisions of the
Act. This state of affairs has been coupled with complaints of financial
difficulties on the part of many towns in recent attempts to amend the Act
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.201 (Purdon, 1949).
61. Id., § 691.202.
62. Id., § 691.203.
63. Commonwealth ex rel. Duff v. Dravosburg, 38 Munic. L. Rep. 169 (C.P.
Allegheny 1947); cf. Commonwealth v. East Stroudsburg Sewerage Co., 9 Monroe
L.R. 8 (1946).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.202 (Purdon, 1949).
65. Id., § 691.206.
66. Moses, Pennsylvania's Clean-Streams Program, 42 JouR. Am. WATER WORKS
Ass'N 146, 149 (1950).
67. Ibid. Also communication to University of Pennsylvania Law Review from
author.

234

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

of 1937.68 At present, no more than two years may elapse between issuance
of an order to construct and completion of the project. 69 It is sought to
change this to four years (and from one to two years in the case of industry). Such an amendment, however, is in conflict with the basic statutory policy-the wide discretion vested in the Board. If it is sincerely
felt that material and labor shortages make it impossible to comply with
the existing law, the better solution would be to extend the discretion of
the Board in the matter of ultimate completion deadlines. For example,
section 302 permits delays for industry in the, case of "exigencies created
by the present war." It is doubtful that this 1945 amendment is applicable
under the present world crisis, but an amendment drafted on similar lines
and applicable to both industry and municipalities could achieve the desired
result without any attempt to impose arbitrary deadlines. In this way the
Board could determine in each case whether conditions did in fact warrant
a time extension, and if so, how long it should be. The assumption, of
course, is that the Board will act fairly and carry out the original legislative intent that all harmful pollution be ended as quickly as possible with
due regard for individual factual situations.
Industrial Wastes--The article of the Act of 1937 concerning industrial wastes, as strengthened by the amendments of 1945, is the first
attempt in Pennsylvania to control by statute this major source of pollution. As in the case of sewage there is a general prohibition of the discharge of untreated industrial wastes, 70 a term which includes the various
combinations of pollution. Here, however, the statute is more forceful
and the power of the Sanitary Water Board not so all-inclusive. The industrial enterprise which has received no order from the Board must not
consider itself immune from abatement action, for § 302 of the Act contains
a broadly phrased declaration that regardless of Board action any discharge harmful to public health or animal or aquatic life is unlawful.
Clearly this is no more than an application of the procedural enforcement
devices of the Act to basic riparian law, but the section has been employed
successfully against a firm discharging sulphuric acid sludge into a stream
with resultant destruction of aquatic life. 71 The statute is unambiguous; if
it can be found that the stated injury is in fact taking place, the court must
act. Also protected regardless of actions of the Board are whatever "clean
streams" remain in the Commonwealth. Industry contemplating development on such a stream must provide for "complete" treatment of its
wastes,72 involving all the engineering problems discussed above. On
other streams industry must comply with such treatment requirements as
68. See Phila. Legal Intelligencer, April 18, 1951, p. 6, col. 4; Phila. Inquirer,
Sept. 19, 1951, p. 27, col. 1.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §691.203 (Purdon, 1949).
70. Id., § 691.301.
71. Commonwealth v. Sonneborn, 164 Pa. Super. 493, 66 A.2d 584 (1949).
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.306 (Purdon, 1949).
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the Board may find necessary, 73 and no planning or construction of treatment works may in any case be carried into effect without approval of the
Board. 74 The general policy of the Board has been that all industrial wastes
shall be treated to a degree equivalent to that required for sewage in the
same area,7 5 and of 846 orders to industry many now call for actual construction.
The Ghost of Sanderson-Perhaps the greatest unsolved pollution
problem is that of acid mine drainage. That this type of pollution can be
serious is shown by the case of the city of McKeesport, which was forced for
many years to abandon use of the Youghiogheny River as its water supply.
Whether as a result of pressure from coal interests or for valid economic
reasons, such pollution is exempted from the provisions of the Act until
such time as a "practical means" of treatment is found.7 6 Pennsylvania
is not alone in this respect; in fact several states exempt all mining operations. 77 The question is not so much the feasibility of treatment (even the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has agreed that acid pollution can be
avoided) 78 as determination of a method within sound economic range.
79,
Research toward this end has been carried on by the Mellon Institute.
Some protection to the public is offered in a provision for state-aided diversion of the drainage to other polluted streams; 80 but this is little consolation
in an overall program to end pollution, and this provision of the Act has
in fact gone unused. The result has been that while other sources of pollution have decreased in the last few years there has been little change in
the flow of acid drainage,81 other than through the sealing of abandoned
mines by the Commonwealth.
That facts for an overall program in regard to mining pollution can
be assembled is assured by provisions that all mines submit drainage plans
to the board.82 Failure to submit such plans and obtain Board approval,
regardless of evidence of absence of drainage, has led to the enjoining of
one strip mining operation. 3 It is to be hoped that on the basis of information so assembled and as a result of engineering research now in progress,
an administrative policy can soon be formulated which will end the immunity now granted acid mine drainage, just as an administrative policy
73. Id., §§ 691.302, 691.307.
74. Id., § 691.308.
75. Moses, supra note 66, at 149.
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §691.310 (Purdon, 1949).
77. Virginia and West Virginia statutes expressly exempt most mining wastes.
Ohio and Nevada were listed in 1948 as reaching the same result in administration,
44 CHEM. ENG. PROGRESs 5 (1948).

78. See Commonwealth ex reL. Chidsey v. Black, 363 Pa. 231, 240, 69 A.2d 376,
380 (1949).
79. Moses, supra note 66, at 150.
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.310 to 691.312 (Purdon, 1949).
81. See WATER REsoURcEs INVEsTIGATIONs RELATING TO THE SCHUYLKILI RIVER
RESTORATION PROJECT 11 (U.S. Dep't. Int. 1950).
82. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §691.313 (Purdon, 1949).
83. Commonwealth ex reL Chidsey v. Black, 363 Pa. 231, 69 A.2d 376 (1949).
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applied the Act to the deposit of coal silt even before legislative action in
the 1945 amendments.
Remedies under the statute-It is apparent that, as in most states, the
basis of the present clean streams program in Pennsylvania is the efficient
employment of an administrative program. The basic legal rights and obligations remain essentially those of common law and equity, with the very
remedies which proved ineffective specifically incorporated into the Act.8 4
Hope for better results lies in two new concepts: first, the very nature of a
coordinated approach to the problem and, second, a shift in the approach
of enforcement. In this latter respect, an individual need not now commence
legal action on his own account but may complain to the Sanitary Water
Board, whose duty it is to investigate.8 5 Added to this is the remedy of
suits in the name of the Commonwealth upon relation of the Attorney General or district attorney. 6 Thus the emphasis has shifted to state control,
a sound approach for such a statewide problem in so far as the Board is
alert and fair in carrying out its duties. A bitter charge that the Board was
"covering up" for certain coal operations, 7 however, recently pointid up
the potential danger in this system. Just as common law enforcement was
lax, so a statutory program will fail unless efficiently implemented. Continued power of the individual, nevertheless, is shown by a recent supreme
court decision providing a check on administrative action. A sportsmen's
league, impatient with Board inaction, brought suit in equity against both
the alleged offender and the members of the Sanitary Water Board as
individuals. The lower court held that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter on the grounds that the Board must act first, a result which
would have carried administrative discretion to the extreme. The supreme
court reversed, holding that the statutory remedy was not exclusive, and
that plaintiff could invoke general equity jurisdiction.8 8 Thus in operation
at one time are the deterrents of common law and equitable remedies, Board
action, and possible fines and penalties up to $5,000.89 Experience indicates
that none of these alone constitutes a guarantee against unlawful pollution;
yet combined and within the framework of a comprehensive adminstrative
plan, they offer an approach to pollution control which has thus far proved
far more effective than the former reliance on individual court actions.
INTERSTATE AND FEDERAL ACTION

Since rivers frequently constitute or cross state boundaries, enforcement action by one state alone may be of little overall value. Even within
84. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§691.601, 691.701 (Purdon, 1949).

85. Id., § 691.604.
86. Id., § 691.601.
87. See Phila. Inquirer, August 26, 1951, § B, p. 1, col. 7. The charges were
subsequently refuted by tests of the streams involved, Phila. Inquirer, Sept. 8, 1951,
p. 1, col. 4.
88. Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v. New York & Pennsylvania Co., 367 Pa.
40, 79 A.2d 439 (1951).
89. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.309 (Purdon, 1949).
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a single state it is an integrated program of pollution control which today
offers most promise of success. The obvious need for unified action has
stimulated a growing tendency toward interstate agreements, accomplished
either by reciprocal legislation or compacts with Congressional approval. 90
As a result of three such agreements, 91 Pennsylvania communities and industry on the Delaware, Ohio, and Potomac rivers and their tributaries
are now faced with decisions by interstate commissions as well as by the
Sanitary Water Board, though actual implementation of resulting policies
within the Commonwealth is in the hands of the Department of Health.
The reciprocal legislation creating the Interstate Commission on the
Delaware River Basin is an unusual example of a detailed and carefully
worked out legislative policy of stream pollution control. Contrasting
sharply with the flexible administrative control under the Pennsylvania
Act of 1937 are those provisions of this agreement establishing four distinct
zones along the Delaware with detailed technological requirements for the
treatment required in each zone.92 For the industry operating in one of
these zones or planning to build there, the agreemeit provides an exact
picture of what will be required. It may be questioned whether greater
freedom of administrative decision, allowed by most state acts, is not more
desirable in the formulation of a program suited to individual and changing
problems. Engineering sources are of the opinion that little advantage can
be had in articulating in great detail the standards to be met. If a board
or commission is to be established in any event, it would seem best to give
that agency discretion to develop its program as it carries out its task. Regardless of the method chosen, the effectiveness of the program, as in the
case of individual states, depends on the efficiency with which the administrative agency carries out the legislative policy.
The federal government has only recently taken an active interest in
river pollution control other than in the form of Congressional approval of
interstate compacts. Acting under its power over navigable waters, Congress in 1948 passed the Water Pollution Control Act,9 3 with the asserted
purpose of aiding the states in carrying out their primary responsibility.
Pollution of interstate waters is declared a public nuisance and an additional, though complex, abatement procedure offered. 9 ' If after two notices
to the appropriate state agency by the Surgeon General no action is forthcoming, the Federal Security Administrator may call a public hearing, and
90. It is the express policy of Congress to encourage such agreements, with a
pledge of approval in the case of compacts. 62 STAT. 1155, 1156 (1948), as amended,
33 U.S.C. §466a(b) & (c) (Supp. 1950).
91. Interstate Commission on the Delaware River Basin, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§ 815.31 et seq. (Purdon, 1949); Ohio River Valley Sanitation Compact, PA. STAT.
tit. 32, §816.1 et seq. (Purdon, 1949); Interstate Commission on the Potomac
River Basin, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 741 (Purdon, 1949) ; with reciprocal legislation cited.
92. See §§4 and 5 of the reciprocal agreement concerning the Delaware River,
supra note 91.
ANN.

93. 62 STAT. 1155 et seq. (1948), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 466 (Supp. 1950).
94. 33 U.S.C. §466a(d) (Supp. 1950).
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after a reasonable time and with consent of the state in question, request
the Attorney, General to bring suit on behalf of the United States to abate
the nuisance. This is little more than a potential threat, for a state which
permits its own agency to fail twice to act upon federal notice seems unlikely to consent to the suit. Further federal action, leading to an overall
control policy, may be anticipated, but will prove unnecessary if action by
the states individually and through joint commissions is effectively carried
out along existing lines. Stream pollution is a problem which can be met
at the state and interstate level since the sources of contamination are localized and the problems variable.
THE FINANCIAL BURDEN OF STREAM PURIFICATION

The most publicized aspect of the clean streams program in Pennsylvania has been the restoration of the Schuylkill River. For the first time
in years the upper reaches of that river are clear instead of choked with
culm. 5 Under the Schuylkill Desilting Act,96 an initial appropriation of
$5,000,000 was made to a fund to be used by the Water and Power Resources Bpard of the Department of Forests and Waters to carry out dredging, construction of desilting basins, and other necessary projects, using
eminent domain wherever necessary. The total cost to the state in completing this project has been $35,000,000. 9 7 Of interest to agencies contemplating similar reclamation activities was the formation of a jointventure group composed of four construction firms which carried out the
state's program at a saving. 98 Further action on the part of the federal
government is required io enable the Army Engineer Corps to complete
the project in the navigable area of the river. Failure of the government
to comply on schedule with its agreement to do this work is evidence of the
more satisfactory results obtained thus far by approaching pollution on a
state or regional basis.9 9 The local project becomes a matter of local pub95. Inspection by the present writer of stretches of the Schuylkill River for fifty
miles above Norristown, Pa., reveals virtually complete absence of the silt deposits
which choked the channel several years ago. The water itself is clear; and at Port
Clinton, just below the coal regions, there is little indication of any new silt on the
river bed. Continued existence of acid drainage, however, is demonstrated by unofficial
experiments on September 19, 1951, revealing the following pH values (where 7.0
equals neutral); Schuylkill at Port Clinton, 4.1; Little Schuylkill at Port Clinton,
under 3.8; Schuylkill at Pottstown, 6.4. (These figures correspond to the respective

official figures for September, 1948: 4.5, 3.6, 7.0.)
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 751.1 et seq. (Purdon, 1949).
97. The Pennsylvania Department of Forests and Waters reports that the books
of the Project Engineers were closed as of July 1, 1951. State appropriations totaled
$27,000,000, and the General State Authority allocated $8,000,000 to the project.
Vouchers cleared through the engineers amounted to $31,784,744.41, and sufficient

funds remained to establish adequate reserves for Army land acquisition and for

emergencies such as removal of flood-borne silt.
98. See WATER RESOURCES INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 81, at 9.
99. On October 16, 1951, a Senate-House conference committee approved a
$1,900,000 appropriation for removal of silt between Norristown, Pa., and the Fairmount Dam in Philadelphia. Phila. Evening Bulletin, Oct. 17, 1951, p. 52, col. 4.
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lic interest, not just another regional bill to be traded off against others in
Congress.
While reclamation is the aspect of stream sanitation most prominent in
the public eye, the major economic problem lies in financing the complex
facilities needed to prevent untreated wastes from reaching rivers. While
about 300 sewage treatment works existed in Pennsylvania prior to 1937,
the larger cities failed, in general, to provide adequate treatment. As a
result many municipalities find the burden of constructing complete systems
thrust upon them at one time. An even greater economic burden may face
the smaller community which must construct equally efficient facilities with
lesser resources. To solve these financial problems without reducing other
governmental services, the municipality must weigh several available courses
of action.
The initial determination involves ownership and management of the
proposed system. A city may choose to operate its own facilities cn a par
with other governmental activities or it may give direct control to persons
outside the city government by creating a local authority. The former
method is suggested by provisions in the Act of 1937 for special municipal
bonds which need not be charged against the general debt of the city if
the system is made self-sustaining through imposition of sewer charges. 00
Philadelphia has adopted such a method to finance three treatment plants at
a cost estimated at $50,000,000 to $60,000,000. Many other communities
have chosen to create authorities under the Municipality Authorities Act
of 1945,101 a method particularly suited to areas where a number of contiguous governmental units wish to meet their common needs with a single
project.' 02 Thus sixty or seventy municipalities including Pittsburgh will
be served by the Allegheny Authority,' 0 3 while three authorities will provide facilities for thirty communities in Delaware County. The choice really
depends on who is to have control and management, for the creation of an
authority is not essential to the joint use of a municipal sewerage system.
Careful consideration should also be given to the size and scope of the
project. At least one engineering source contends that a series of small,
independent plants may be most economical.' 0 4
Regardless of the method chosen, financing in most cases involves the
use of revenue bonds, payment on which is based entirely on rates and
charges on the theory that such financing is on a business as opposed to
a tax basis. Revenue bonds require legislative authorization and have yet
to receive acceptance throughout the country.' 0 5 They offer great pos100. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

35,

691.210 (Purdon, 1949).

For authorization of the

imposition of sewer charges see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1030 (Purdon, Supp. 1950).
101. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 2900z-1 to 2900z-20 (Purdon, Supp. 1950).
102. Permission to make such agreements with authorities organized in another
county is granted in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1031.1 (Purdon, Supp. 1950).
103. See Moses, supra note 66, at 150; 10 U. OF Pirr. L. REv. 345, 351 (1949).
104. I xoFF & FAIR, op. cit. supra note 13, at 2.
105. The American City, July, 1949, p. 13, lists twelve states denying the use
of revenue bonds for sewage districts. Permission in Pennsylvania is granted in
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.211 (Purdon, 1949).
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sibilities in Pennsylvania because of their self-liquidating nature which
permits their use without inclusion in the general municipal debt, whether
employed by the city itself or by an authority. Philadelphia, for example,
would have more than exhausted its debt limitation had the cost of its
present sewerage program been included in its general debt.
Another basic financing problem is determination of who should bear
the cost of sewerage projects. An extensive study published recently arrives at the conclusion that non-user property as well as users of sewerage
facilities should bear part of the burden, especially in the case of initial plant
construction. 10 This burden on property as opposed to use is based on the
potentiality that the excess capacity built into a new system will be a future
advantage to the property. Assuming that this conclusion is economically
sound, it leaves unanswered certain questions as to the use of revenue bonds
and authority financing. It is argued that even municipal authorities should
be able'to impose charges on non-user property. 10 7 Yet thus far the Allegheny Authority has based rates on actual use, 0 8 and Philadelphians without sewer service have escaped paying that city's sewer charges. Therefore, if non-user property should properly bear a share of construction
costs, a wider basis for imposing charges will be necessary. The alternative
of general taxation and thus general debt bonds is not satisfactory, since
the alleged benefit to non-user property would in many cases be offset by a
decrease in other improvements resulting from exhaustion of debt limitation.
While the cost of sewage treatment will be borne ultimately in one
way or another by users or property owners, at least part of the initial cost
may involve state or federal aid. The Pennsylvania Department of Health
has made grants-in-aid not exceeding 50% of the cost of plans, and totaling
$1,128,874.72 as of August, 1951.109 Federal aid may be obtained by way
of Federal Security Agency loans, not exceeding one-third of the cost or
$250,000,110 as well as through varying appropriations directly to the states.
In the case of industry, state and federal aid is virtually non-existent,
despite the general legislative recognition of the complexity of the industrial
waste problem. A major Philadelphia alcohol plant did receive federal
aid in constructing treatment facilities at a cost of $10,000,000,"' but for
the primary purpose of recovering war-needed grain by-products, and not
the incidental removal of a serious pollution problem. Aid more directly
in line with the purposes of the Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 has
been proposed in the form of an accelerated rate of amortization of treat106. See 12 OHio ST. L.J. 156, 175 (1951).
107. Id. at 191.
108. 10 U. OF PITT. L. REv. 345, 359 (1949).
109. Figure supplied by Pa. Dept. of Health.
110. 33 U.S.C. §466d (Supp. 1950).
111. See Report of the Interstate Commission on the Delaware River Basin,
June, 1945, p. 17.
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ment works for income tax purposes. The most recent bill of this type
was introduced in the House by Representative Byrnes of Wisconsin on
September 25, 1951.112 State aid in Pennsylvania is non-existent, though
precedent exists in the unused provisions for diversion of acid drainage." 3
An argument can be made that regional taxpayers as opposed to an industry's nationwide consumers should bear part of this cost of preserving
local streams. Against this, of course, is the argument that preservation
should be a cost of the business which makes use of the stream. Where a
municipal sewage plant is available, and where the particular waste should
not be excluded from it," 4 the industry will have to pay no more than its
share of the municipal project in the form of sewer charges, sharing proportionately with others in the area to be benefited. Otherwise each industrial enterprise faces the expense of constructing and operating its own
treatment plant suited to its particular waste problem. Though research
by state, federal, and private agencies is constantly striving for cheaper and
more efficient treatment methods," 5 the construction and operating expenses
of industry present financial problems which have not as yet received attention proportionate to that granted in response to loud outcries from many
municipalities.
CONCLUSION

Carried out under a state administration which has given extensive attention to the problem, Pennsylvania's clean streams program has received
national attention, particularly in respect to reclamation of certain water
courses. Pollution, however, is not an evil which can be ended overnight;
there are confli6ting economic interests, excessive financial burdens, and
unsolved engineering problems, all of which must be taken into account in
a long range program without regard to the political exigencies of the
moment. The task of the Sanitary Water Board, or its counterpart in
any state, must be to advance such a program by determining which interests have valid claims and by calling for legislative and judicial aid where
needed. Herein lie the advantages of the new approach to stream pollution
-a centralized analysis of the problems of specific rivers and watersheds
aimed at eliminating existing pollution and preventing new contamination.
Results to date presage the success of this type of enforcement, but only
continuing enthusiasm will assure an ultimate solution to the stream pollution problem.
Seymour C. Wagner
112. H.R. 5474, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
113. See text at note 80 supra.
114. ImioFF & FAr, op. cit. supra note 13, at 260.
115. An example is research into problems of slaughterhouses undertaken by
Pennsylvania State College. See Moses, supra note 66, at 150.
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INCENTIVE PLANS UNDER THE NATIONAL WAR
LABOR BOARD
Incentive plans are of particular importance in a war or semi-war
economy. They are welcomed by the production authorities because they
are the fastest and easiest way of increasing production, so badly needed in
times of stress. Labor, despite its natural suspicion arising out of past
experiences with rate-cutting and other abuses, welcomes incentive plans
because of their promise of increasing earnings which have been stabilized
in the fight against inflation. Management welcomes incentive plans because of their promise of lower costs in a period of fixed prices. In order
to achieve these ends, however, incentive plans must be established on
sound principles of economics, industrial engineering and labor relations.
A poor plan can result not only in decreased production and inflationary
wage raises, but in the lowering of morale and creating of unrest among
the workers. The National War Labor Board was delegated the respon-

sibility of preventing this in World War II.
With the placing of our economy on a semi-war footing, incentive
plans will once again play an important role in mobilizing the forces of
democracy for the effort which lies ahead. The problems faced by the present Wage Stabilization Board will be quite similar to those faced by the
National War Labor Board and will probably be disposed of in a similar
way. By examining the way in which some of these problems were handled
in World War II it will be possible to forecast, in part, their disposition
under present wage stabilization policies, and will also help to avoid some
of the pitfalls which were inevitable in World War II.
APPROVAL OF INCENTIVE PLANS
Basic Incentive Principle.-The basic payment for work performed is
usually called the base or job rate. This type of payment is in the form of
a specific hourly rate without reference to the amount of work done. The
rate which is to be paid the employee depends upon job evaluation, taking
into consideration such things as job content, relationship of the job to
others in the plant and the going rates in the labor market for similar
work. The rate structure analyst has no interest in whether or not the
job will be placed on incentive because that consideration has no proper
bearing on the evaluation of the job and the establishment of the rate for it.
The basis of an incentive system is the establishment of a norm or
production standard. It is important to keep in mind that the rate evaluation has no bearing on the establishment of the production standard which
is really the setting of a standard task without consideration of its economic worth in the rate structure. It is usually defined as the number of
units which a normal worker working at a normal rate will produce in a
certain time, or as the number of units of time which this worker will
take to complete a specified number of units of production. This standard
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is usually set from time studies of the workers themselves or from past
records of production. These standards are then translated into money
by the use of the base rate. For example if it is found that the standard
production is 100 units an hour and the base rate is $1.00 an hour, the
worker is paid one cent per unit produced-which is known as the piece
rate, an expression of the task in form of money. If the task is expressed
in terms of time the worker is given credit for 60 minutes of work for
every 100 units produced. Under a piece-rate if a worker produces 120
units in an hour, then his straightI time hourly earnings are 120 multiplied
by the piece rate of one cent per unit or $1.20. Under a time system he
120
is given credit for x 60 or 72 minutes which at a $1.00 an hour is equal
100
to a straight time hourly earning of $1.20. Under such a plan the labor
cost per unit remains constant regardless of the number of units produced.2
As will be seen below this is the main criterion for approval under wage
stabilization policy. All true incentive plans, individual plans, group plans
or plant-wide plans, conform to this general principle of uniform labor cost
regardless of production.
There are two important modifications of this general principle. The
first is the "guaranteed minimum wage," the purpose of which is to protect
the worker against very low weekly wages which might result because of
his low out-put for the week possibly through no fault of his own. The
second is the "split-system" whereby credit for production above standard
is divided between the employer and the worker.
Policy of the Board.--As a result of the enthusiastic support 3 of the
War Production Board for incentive plans, Executive Order No. 9328,
the "hold-the-line" order of April 8, 1943, which was designed primarily
to limit further wage and price increases, 4 contained a provision empowering the War Labor Board to authorize "reasonable adjustments of wages
and salaries in the case of . . . incentive wages or the like, provided such
adjustments do not increase the level of production costs appreciably or
furnish the basis either to increase prices or to resist otherwise justifiable
1. As opposed to overtime premium.
2. Total cost of all units is decreased, however, when production is augmented
through the increased effort of the workers, since it allows over-head-costs to be
prorated over a larger number of units.
3. The enthusiasm of the WPB was apparently justified. According to Chairman
J.A. Krug, incentive plans made possible the increase in productivity for workers of
between 30 and 357o above the 1940 levels in 1944. A HANDBOOK ON WAGE INCENTIVE
PLANS (Management Consultant Division of the War Production Board).
4. Exec. Order No. 9250, 7 FED. REG. 1781 (1942), had given the Board considerable discretion in carrying out the stabilization program by providing that: "The
National Board shall not approve any increases in the wage rates prevailing on Sept.
15, 1942, unless such increase is necessary to correct maladjustments or inequalities, to
eliminate substandards of living, to correct gross inequities, or to aid in the effective
production of the war."
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decreases in prices." Prior to Executive Order 9328, few new incentive
plans had been submitted to the Board for approval. 5
The issuance of Executive Order 9328 resulted in a strong interest6
in incentive plans and within six months approximately 800 incentive plans
of various types were submitted to the War Labor Board for approval.7
The interest was so strong, in fact, that the National Board felt it necessary in Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp.8 to point out that the incentive plan was not an "easy panacea," but was to be considered a major
and complex problem requiring the combined best efforts of specialists and
of top executives. A great number of the plans submitted, it went on to
state, were nothing more than obvious and clumsy attempts to provide
hidden wage increases contrary to the national wage stabilization program. 9
On October 2, 1943 the Board unanimously passed two resolutions
laying down general policy to be followed in the approval of proposed
incentive plans. 1° The main purport of these resolutions was that the Board
would not order an incentive plan established in a dispute case where the
employees were represented by a union 'i and that the Board's approval
would not constitute approval of the merits of the plan as an incentive
program but only a certification that it was consistent with the wage
stabilization program.12 The policy against ordering an incentive plan
in a dispute case was based on the feeling that it would be "incompatible
with the need for cooperative effort which is basic to the success of such
programs." '3 This policy of the Board was also held to be applicable
5. All of the cases prior to this date, which are reported, involved incentive plans
already in existence and pertained usually to a request for increases in base or piece
rates. These cases, as other wage increases, were handled on the basis of the discretion given to the Board under Executive Order 9250 to approve increases for

maladjustment or inequities, etc., 1 TERMINATION REPoRT OF THE NATIONAL WAR
LABOR BoARD 325. In Cranston Print Works, 5 WAR LAB. REP. 451 (1942) the

NWLB had ordered the company and the union to jointly establish an incentive
system to increase earnings of "jig hands" where current rate was found to be below'
average of other plants in the area.
6. In the Termination Report the National War Labor Board points out that
part of the reason for the increased interest by unions and employers Was the wide
latitude given industry in setting piece rates, because of the impossibility of the Board's
requiring approval of every new piece rate. Id. at 322 nl.
7. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, 11 WAR LAB. REP. 322, 323
(1943).
8. Id. at 324.
9. Ibid.
10. 11 WAR LAB. REP. XXXIX (1943).
11. Where the plant was not organized the Board required a showing by the
company that the employees desired the plan. Ebaloy Foundries, 13 WAR LAB. REP.
48 (1943) (one of the reasons given for denying approval of the plan was the failure
of the company to indicate that the employees desired it).
12. The Board limited its approval in order to make it clear that in case of a
future dispute arising out of an established plan it would not be bound by its initial
approval.
13. 11 WAR LAB. REP. XXXIX (1943). In the following cases the Board refused
to order establishment of an incentive system over union objection: Valley Mould and
Iron Corp., 10 WAR LAB. REP. 350 (1943) (Board stated that under Executive Order
9328 it did not have the authority to establish an incentive plan where one of the
parties opposed it). But cf. Bendix Aviation Corp., 27 WAR LAB. REP. 739 (Regional
Board II, 1945) (Company had agreed to submit an incentive plan by a stipulated date
and one year after had not done so. The Board ordered the company to pay the
workers the amount they would have earned if there had been an incentive plan sincd
the company should honor a voluntarily negotiated agreement).
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to the extension of an existing plan to departments or groups of hourlyrated employees not covered by the plan, 14 but not to the extension to
newly established jobs.15 While the Board would not order establishment
in a dispute case it would order parties to negotiate on the subject of incentive plans as a proper subject for collective bargaining in that it affected
the pay of the employees.' 6
The Resolutions of October 2, 1943, also laid down the general criteria under which plans would be judged. These were mainly that the
plan should involve neither wage decreases or increases nor increases in
unit costs. The only significant test as it turned out in practice was the
latter-whether or not unit costs would be increased. The reason for this
was that any plan resulting in a decrease in wages would seldom get to
the Board for approval since the union would not join in its submission,
and a plan involving an increase contrary to the wage stabilization program would necessarily increase unit cost. A corollary test applied by the
Board was a determination whether there was sufficient relation between
the bonus and the standard to provide a real incentive to increase production. More specific requirements were laid down in the policy statements of the different Regional Boards. 17 A check list indicating specific
information received by the Board was also made available in order to
expedite handling of voluntary incentive cases.' 8 The establishment of an
incentive plan without prior approval was considered a violation of the
Economic Stabilization Act and the regulations issued under it.'1
TYPES OF PLANS BEFORE BOARDS FOR APPROVAL

Individual Plans.-The traditional plan in effect before World War II
had been the individual plan wherein the standard was established in accordance with engineering principles on the base of time study of all or of a
representative number of individual operations, when such factors as products, operations and working conditions had been sufficiently standardized.
Since these individual plans were based on time study and the incentive
earnings were directly related to individual effort, their effect on unit costs
and their incentive value were easily determined, and thus approval by
the Board was practically automatic. 20 Group plans with standards based
14. Bethlehem Steel Company, 12 WAR LAB. REP. 255 (1943). But cf. Erwin
Cotton Mills Co., 24 WAR LAB. REP. 418 (1945) (Board found contract authority

to extend existing incentive system to other departments in a provision allowing the
company to change assignments in order to adjust the work-load, against union contention that this could not be done).
15. G. F. Richter Co., 26 WAR LAB. REP. 362 (1943).'
16. Firestone Rubber and Metal Products Co., 14 WAR LAB. REP. 621 (1944).
17. 13 WAR LAB. REP. XXIX, XXX; 15 WAR LAB. REP. LIX; 11 WAR LAB.
REP. XXXIX.
18. 11 WAR LAB. REP. XLI; 14 WAR LAB. REP. XV.
19. In Portland Sportswear Co., 12 WAR LAB. RFP. 665 (1943), the Board refused

to consider the plan on its merits (i.e., whether or not it resulted in increase in unit
costs) but looked only to see if it had resulted in increased earnings.
20. Because they posed no problem to the Board, very few decisions of the Board
approving them were published. The Board approved individual plans in the follow-
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on time study were, in effect, similar to individual plans and received the
same treatment by the Board.
Plans Based on Other Than Time Study.-The immediate need in
the early years of the war was to find a means of increasing production
in a vast number of plants. While the traditional plan was the most
effective since the amount of production and increased earnings are the
individual's sole responsibility, they could only be established through timeconsuming time-studies and they required the services of a large number
of trained technicians to develop and maintain them, of which there were
not enough to fill the need of the emergency. Because of this problem
and the importance of increasing war production, the National War
Labor Board in Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp.2 1 felt justified in
experimenting 22 with incentive plan standards based on other than time
studies and applicable to large groups or departments and even to entire
plants hiring thousands of workers.
The basic principle of the over-all incentive plan was a standard based
on total production with all the employees receiving a percentage increase
for increased production over the standard regardless of individual contribution to the increased production. This standard was usually based
on previous performance for a specified period and was usually expressed
in man hours per unit of production.23 For example, in the Grumman
case the standard was found by relating the number of pounds of aircraft
produced to the number of man-hours expended in producing them. If
the ratio between pounds of airplanes produced and man-hours expended increased, the workers were to receive a percentage increase over the base
24
rate.
ing decisions. All were established on time-study and gave worker 100% credit for'
production over standard. Lear-Avia Corp., 10 WAR LAB. REP. 784 (1943) ; Republic
Drill and Tool Co., 13 WAR LAB. REP. 482 (1943); U.S. Rubber Co., 14 WAR LAB.
REP. 354 (1944).
The only individual plan disapproved by the Board was rejected
on the grounds that it involved an unauthorized decrease in wages since it provided for
a reduction in the base rate of pay from 81 cents, the existing hourly rate, to 72 cents
under the proposed incentive plan. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 11 WAR LAB.
REP. 767 (1943).
21. 11 WAR LAB. REP. 322 (1943).
22. "The overall wage incentive program is novel and can only be thought of as art
emergency to meet the exigencies of war. The results of such a program cannot be
adequately anticipated. The National War Labor Board has no right, and no desire,
to forestall experimentation with the device which many competent persons believe
will increase production." Id. at 324, 325.
23. In Randall Company, 9 WAR LAB. REP. 175 (1943), the production standard
was established by dividing the number of units produced in the week of January 10,
1943 (36,000) by the number of man-hours expended that week (10,108) thus establishing a base rate of .2807 units per man-hour.
24. It is to be noted that fixing the base rate on the relation of man-hours per unit
of production automatically allows for expansion and contraction of the labor force.
For example if it is found that during the specified period 1000 man-hours resulted
in the production of 1000 lbs. of airplanes then the base rate would be 1.00. If production, due to increased efficiency, increases 50% to 1500 pounds of plane per 1000 manhours the rate of production is 1.5 and the workers are entitled to a 50% increase in
wages. However, if production is increased to 1500 pounds of airplane because of a
50 per cent increase in the labor force the rate of production remains at 1.00 and no
incentive is earned. Also units costs are not increased where productive efficiency
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Variables Affecting Validity of Standard.-The first problem arising
in this type of incentive standard was determining how the units of production were to be expressed. Where a plant was producing only one
standard product it could be expressed by the number of this product
produced.25 Where a standard was established for a multiproduct plant
where production was stabilized as to the ratio between the various products
produced the standard could be expressed in terms of pounds per man-hour
as in the Grumnman case. However, in a multiproduct plant in which the
percentage of the various products produced varied from month to month
a standard expressed in terms of products per hour or pounds per hour
could not be used since it might require more man-hours to produce
product A or pounds of product A than it would of product B. 28 This
problem was solved in one case by expressing the unit of production in
forms of value, with specified restrictions to allow for change of value
s7
resulting from a change of price rather than increased output
Another variable which affected the validity of the standard was a
28
If
modification or change in specifications of the product produced.
the product was simplified, without an increase in effort, production could
be increased. If it was made more complex, production would decrease
for the same effort.
If the standard was based on an experienced work force the subsequent addition of new experienced workers because of increased turnover
or expansion, could vitally affect the group result other than by a change
in the amount of effort.29
A decrease in man-hours per unit of production may be attributable

to more efficient management or equipment. Hand processes may be supplemented by machine operators entailing expensive engineering work and
additional capital investment. Standardization of materials or improved
flow of raw materials or improved layout may prevent bottlenecks and inis increased. Assuming that the average base rate of pay is $1.00 an hour of standard
production, 1000 units are produced at a cost of $1000 (1000 hours x $1.00 base rate)
or a unit cost of $1.00 per unit. Where production is increased to 1500 pounds of
airplane per 1000 man-hours the workers are entitled to a 50 cent bonus per hour
and are paid at the value of $1.50 an hour. The cost for the 1500 units is now $1500
(1000 hours x rate of $1.50 per hour) and unit cost remains at $1.00 per unit.
25. In Randall Company, 9 WAR LAD. REP. 175 (1943) production standard was
.2807 units per man-hour. Lehigh Structural Steel Co., 12 WAR LAB. REP. 339 (1943)
(Plant produced tank lighters. Standard was set at 13 tank lighters per month).
26. For example. Product A, an automatic pilot, requires 200 hours to produce.
Product B, a simple suction pump, can be produced in 100 hours. The base rate is established as 2 units of A & B per 300 man-hours or 150 man-hours per unit at a time
when production is equally divided between A & B. If, in a certain period only product A is produced at standard production it will take 200 man-hours per unit of production which will result in the base rate of 150 man-hours per unit being inaccurate.
This factor was recognized in the Grumman case: "Pounds of airplane for manhour may, without any change in employee effort increase or decrease materially because of far reaching changes in specifications of the planes produced. Planes may
become more simplified or complex in design. The relative proportion of bombers
to trainers, for example, may be changed." 11 WAR LAn. REP. 322, 325.
27. Continental Motors Corp., 26 WAR LAB. REP. 850 (1945).
28. Quote from Grumman case, supra note 26.
29. Ibid.
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crease the rate of production. Such contributions to increased production
are usually more pronounced during the early stages in the development of
a new plant or a new product. In the early stages, a steady increase in
production per man-hour is expected and something is wrong if it doesn't
occur. During this "breaking-in" period when "bugs" are being eliminated,
it is unlikely that an over-all wage incentive can be introduced with much
likelihood of assistance to production.8 ° This problem of establishing a
standard during the "breaking-in" period was solved in Chance Vought
Division of the United Aircraft Corp.31 by establishing a series of standards
set at progressively increasing levels of output, starting with 29 planes per
month and ending with 48 planes per month. In Republic Aviation Corporation3 2 the standard was based on an estimate of future efficiency calculated on the basis of actual past performance.
Percentage of Participationin Resulting Savings.-Where production
is increased over the standard how much of the resulting savings should
be credited to the workers? The answer to this question depends upon
the extent to which this increased production is attributable to increased
effort on the part of the workers. In individual incentive plans, based on
modern techniques and practices in time and motion study, the effect on
production of factors other than increased effort is negligible and the increased production is practically all attributable to increased effort.3 3 There
are no reported cases of individual incentive plans approved by the Board
in which the workers did not get 100% credit for any production over
the standard.3 4 Also where a group incentive plan was set up on the
basis of group observation and time study a 100% credit was given.3 5
Under plant-wide and group plans based on the more unscientific
standard of previous production, the effect on increased production from
the variable factors mentioned above was considerably greater and so it
is not surprising to find that most of the plans provided for crediting the
workers with only a part of the increased production, usually 50% 36
.
it
About this provision the Board in the Grumman case stated: "
seems that a leeway has been provided to take care of increased pro30. Ibid.
31. (No. 1-5444, November 18, 1943) 1 TERMINATION REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
WAR LABOR BOARD 324 n.10 (1945).
32. 13 WAR LAB. REP. 787 (1943).
33. LOUDEN, WAGE INCENTIVEs (1944). "Athough (split-system) plans were
the vogue some years ago the tendency is toward plans which compensate the workers
in direct proportion to the number of units produced." Diamond Match Company, 18
WAR LAB. REP. 745 (1944) (Individual incentive plan).
34. See note 20 supra.
35. National Automotive Fibres, Inc., 8 WAR LAB. REP. 920 (1943).
36. See Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., 11 WAR LAB. REP. 322 (1943);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, 13 WAR LAB. REP. 785 (1944); Chance-Vought
Division of the United Aircraft Corp. (No. 1-5444 November 18, 1943), 1 TERMINATION REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BoARD 324 n. 11 (1945) (workers were
credited 1 per cent for every 2 per cent increase in production). In Randall Company,
9 WAR LAB. REP. 175 (1943) (workers shared 65-35 in increased production).
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duction occurring from factors to which the employees have not contributed.
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37

Controls Ordered Because of Variable Factors.-The first control
which the National Board instituted because of the effect of variable factors
on the standard in over-all incentive plans, was a careful investigation
into the main details of each plan. 8 In Liberty Aircraft Products
Corp.39 the same plan as in the Grumman case was proposed.. The Board
rejected the proposed plan on the grounds that insufficient evidence had
been presented to the Board to show that the Grumman plan could be applied to Liberty workers.
Another way in which the Board kept a check on these plans was by
providing for periodic review of these plans. 40 This was accomplished by
requiring the company to file quarterly reports on the operations of the
incentive plan, the changes which might occur in production, the number of
man-hours per unit of production, the amount of bonus paid, and any other
41
developments which might affect the suitability of the standard proposed.
"
In National Automotive Fibres,Inc., a provision was made that if earnings increased over 35 per cent, incentive payments were to remain fixed at
that level pending a review of the standard.
Incentive Plansfor Indirect and Non-Production Workers.-The main
problem arising in the establishment of incentive plans for indirect workers 4 is finding a standard which bears a close enough relation to the effort
of indirect workers to insure its incentive value.44 The incentive plans
for indirect workers approved by the Board were based on a variety of
standards. The most effective standard for indirect workers is one which
relates the incentive of the worker directly and solely to his own efforts.
This is feasible, however, only in those situations in which the operations
of the worker are sufficiently standardized so that they are susceptible to
37. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., supra note 36 at 327, 328.
38. "[The] responsibility of the Board is not easily discharged in cases where an
overall plant incentive is proposed. In carrying out its duties, the Board must necessarily go into many of the details of each program." Id. at 325.
39. 13 WAR LAB. REP. 786 (1944).
40. "Since [the standard] may be affected by fluctuations in the variables previously discussed, the National War Labor Board will ordinarily require a periodic
review of such plans in the light of changing conditions. . . . It should be recognized
that significant changes in such variable factors may require a change in the production standards applicable in the incentive plan." Grumman Aircraft Engineering
Corp., supra note 36, at 327.
41. This was done in the following cases: Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp.,
supra note 36; Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, 13 WAR LAB. REP. 785 (1944) ;
Lehigh Structural Steel Corp., 12 WAR LAB. REP. 339 (1943) ; Westinghouse Electric
& Manufacturing Co., 13 WAR LAB. REP. 788 (1944); Republic Aviation Corp., 13
WAR LAB. REp. 787 (1943).
42. 8 WAR LAB. REP. 920 (1943).
43. Includes those classes of workers who change neither the form nor the shape
of the product, and the cost of whose work cannot be applied directly to the specific
units of production.
44. For an excellent summary of the criteria used by the Philadelphia Board in
the approval of indirect worker incentives see: Regional War Labor Board III,
Policy on Indirect Workers' Incentive Plans, 19 WAR LAB. REP. XXXVI (1944).
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time-study or establishment of a standard on prior performance. 45 This
was recognized by the Philadelphia Board, which required an applicant
to demonstrate that a proper plan for indirect workers based upon their
own output could not reasonably be developed before the Board would
consider any other standard. 46
Where such a plan could not be based directly on the workers individual operations, it was often possible to establish a standard based on
the production of the direct or production workers. This was preferably
done, where possible, by grouping the indirect workers with different teams
of direct workers so that their incentive earnings could be closely geared
to the output of the group they directly serviced.47 The Philadelphia Board
also required an applicant to show that this type of plan was impractical
48
before considering an alternative standard.
In instances where the indirect workers served several different groups
so that the production of the direct workers could not serve as an appropriate basis upon which to calculate the bonus of indirect workers, many
plans which -were approved based the incentive of the indirect workers on
the incentive earnings of the direct workers. 49 Where it was impractical
to gear indirect workers to groups of direct workers, a common method
was to set up a plan which included all indirect workers as a whole and
based the standard"on total production. 0 This was often done by including
indirect workers in an over-all plant-wide type plan 5 ' or by extending
an existing plan to cover them.52 Where they were included initially the
chances of approval seemed greater than where a plan already in operation was extended, particularly if production had increased in the interim.
In Lehigh Structural Steel Co.53 the Board approved an extension of an
45. An example of this type of plan is described by Barnes, INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERHere a company made time studies of lift
AND MANAGEMENT 201-202 (1931).
truck operators servicing production departments. The standard was based on the
number of trips per day and for each trip over the standard the operator received a
bonus of 5 cents. In Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company, (No. 401645, October 12, 1943) I TERMINATION REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD, the
NWLB approved an incentive plan for indirect workers, lift truck operators, based
on time study.
46. Regional War Labor Board III (Philadelphia), Policy on Indirect Workers'
ING

Plans, 19 WAR LAB. REP. XXXVI (1944).

47. Republic Drill & Tool Company, 13 WAR LAB. REP. 482 (1943) (Plan covered 220 workers of which 204 ran individual machines and whose earnings were based
on individual production. 13 were "set-up" workers who were divided into departmental groups and whose standard was based on the average production of the departments serviced.)
48. Supra note 46.
49. Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co., 13 WAR LAB. REP. 788 (1944);

Pittsburgh Des Moines Co., 14 WAR LAB. REP. 491 (Shipbuilding Commission, 1944).
50. In Continental Motors Corp., 26 WAR LAB. REP. 850 (1945), the standard was
based on the number of man-hours of non-production workers per dollars of sales
computed on the past five years' performance.
51. E.g., Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 13 WAR LAB. REP. 785 (1944) ; ChanceVought Division of the United Aircraft Corp., (No. 1-5444 November 18, 1943),
I TERmINATION REPORT OF THE NArIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD 322 (1945).
52. Lehigh Structural Steel Co., 12 WAR LAB. REP. 339 (1943).
53. Ibid. In Curtis Wright Corp., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 165 (1945) the Board
denied extension to cover clerical workers of an existing plant-wide plan covering
direct workers.
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existing plant-wide plan for production workers to include 34 inspectors,
machinists, truck drivers and miscellaneous workers. The standard under
the existing plan was 13 tank lighters per week and had been established
in 1942. In less than a year of operation under the plan, as applied only
to production workers, production was at about 17 lighters per week,
or approximately 140 per cent of the production standard. The public
members dissented on the grounds that payment of incentive to the indirect workers would not increase production, since the standard was
only vaguely and indirectly related to the operations of the indirect workers,
and that it would result in an automatic increase in their earnings and in
unit costs without any increase in their effort or output over the current
level. They found proof for this contention in the fact that production
had increased 120 per cent while the maintenance workers were on straight
time 5 4 The public members felt that the plan could be placed on a sound
basis only by establishing a standard based on current production.
Indirect plans do not usually provide for 100 per cent participation in
increased production, but rather, like plant-wide plans, for some smaller
percentage, the degree of participation depending upon the degree of directness to production.5 5 In a few cases an upper limit was placed on
earnings. 5 6 Provision was usually made for quarterly reports to the Board
on operation.5 7 Where production was based on incentive earnings of
direct workers the Board recognized that the standard was valid only if the
numerical ratio between the direct workers and the indirect workers
was maintained 58 and a proviso to this effect was usually inserted 5 9
54. In effect what the Board did in approving this plan was to allow the indirect
workers an increase in pay on the basis of increased efficiency occurring while not
under an incentive. In Packard Motor Car Co., 11 WAR LAB. REP. 372 (1943) increased production and lowered unit costs were held not to justify an increase in pay
since the Board did not have the power to permit increased pay for increased production except under an incentive plan which would not increase unit costs.
55. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 13 WAR LAB. REP. 785 (1944); Regional
War Labor Board III (Philadelphia), Policy on Indirect Workers' Incentive Plans,
19 WAR LAB. RP. XXXVI (1944). (Based on incentive earnings of direct workers.
No bonus until workers reach 115 per cent efficiency. After that one per cent bonus
for every two per cent of efficiency.) Pittsburgh Des Moines Co., 14 WAR LAB. REP.
491 (Shipbuilding Commission, 1944) (Welding supervisors to get percentage increase
Y4 as great as incentive earnings of welders supervised).
56. "In view of the difficulty of establishing precise and equitable relationships
in any such indirect incentive plan and in view of the difficulty of working out a
formula which would not provide for arbitrary increases in earnings, it is suggested
that, in some cases, a ceiling should be imposed on the total amount of bonus to be
paid to any indirect worker.

.

.

."

Regional War Labor Board III (Philadelphia),

19 WAR LAB. REP. XXXVI (1944); Lehigh Structural Steel Co., 12 WAR LAB. RP.
339 (1943).
57. Republic Drill & Tool Co., 13 WAR LAB. Ras'. 482 (1943) ; Lehigh Structural
Steel Corp., 12 WAR LAB. REP,. 339 (1943) ; Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing
Co., 13 WAR LAm. RP. 788 (1944).
58. For example, if in a certain department 3 indirect workers serviced the direct
workers, on whose earnings their incentive bonus was based, the addition of a fourth
worker would cut down on the workload of the indirect workers while their incentive
earnings would remain the same.
59. Lehigh Structural Steel Co., 12 WAR LAB. REP. 339 (1943); Westinghousm
Electric & Manufacturing Co., 13 WAR LAB. RFs. 788 (1944) (Ratio of indirect
workers not to be increased more than 5 per cent unless parties worked out and
Board approved adjustment in standard).
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Incentive plans for indirect workers were usually turned down by
the Board on the ground that the standard was not sufficiently related to
their efforts to constitute a true incentive. In Monroe Steel Casting Co,60
the union's request for extension of a production bonus paid hourly-rated
workers to piece workers was denied. In denying the union's request,
the Board accepted the findings of a Board arbitrator, who had found
that, since earnings of the piece workers varied with the individual's efforts
and skills and bore no relationship to the output of the hourly workers,
there was no justification for including the piece-workers in the bonus
system. The Board also denied an incentive plan proposed for "testers"
of transformers in Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co."' Under
this plan their bonus was to depend upon charges made to the production
department for having to repair transformers supplied to customers which
broke down because originally defective. It was found by the Board that
often these breakdowns occurred five or ten years after the transformer had
been sold to the customers. The Board stated that "it [was] apparent
that charges growing out of breakdowns in equipment sold five or ten
years ago could have no relation to increased efficiency of testing at the
present time, nor is it likely that the anticipation of a bonus five or ten
years hence will greatly stimulate the present electrical testers to maintain
a high degree of operating efficiency." 6 In Continental Motors Corp.6
the Board disapproved a "plant house-keeping" bonus based on a rating
to be given on plant house-keeping by a "task" committee.
ADJUSTMENT OF EXISTING

PLANS UNDER

THE

NWLB

DISPUTE POWER,

A great number of cases involving the operation of existing incentive
plans 64 came before the National War Labor Board under the Board's
authority to make final determinations with respect to labor disputes which
might interrupt "any work which contributes to the effective prosecution
of the war." 5 In the cases on incentive plans to be discussed it is important to keep in mind precisely what the Board was doing.66 Succinctly
60. 10 WAR LAB. REP. 784 (1945).
61. 11 WAR LAn. REP. 584 (1943).
62. Id. at 585.
63. 26 WAR LAB. REP. 850 (1945) An "excellent" rating was to carry a bonus
of five per cent, "good" rating-two per cent, "fair" rating-nothing, and "poor"
rating-minus two per cent. "The proposal would grant extra compensation for
what ordinarily is required of all employees in any well managed plant, and was not
related to any definite standard." Id. at 851.
64. Most of these cases involved individual incentive plans.
65. Executive Order 9017, issued Jan. 12, 1942. For an excellent discussion of
this function of the NWLB see Morse, The National War Labor Board Puts Labor
Law Theory Into Action, 29 IowA L. REv. 175 (1944).
66. This function of the Board has often been referred to as "compulsory arbitration." This is a rather broad use of the term arbitration. Arbitration, in its usual
sense, is used to settle disputes as to the interpretation of an existing contract, the
question before the arbitrator being what are the relations between the parties under
the contract already in effect? The Board's function was broader than this in that it
had the authority to fix new contract terms-in effect it decided not what the relations
of the parties are, but what they should be. See Frey, Arbitration and the War Labor
Board, 29 IowA L. IEv. 202, 203 (1944).
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it can be said that the Board was "making a contract" for the parties.
Usually the issue arose in connection with a request by the union or the
company for the inclusion of a new provision in the parties' agreement or
the modification of an existing provision. 67
Establishment of the Base Rate.-The one thing which did the most
to prejudice the employee against incentive plans in the '20's was the
practice of rate-cutting. In recognition 68 of this, the National War Labor
Board exercised especial care to avoid the evil. This was done by requiring the parties to include in their agreement provisions strictly limiting
the power of management unilaterally to change existing rates or to establish new rates. The principle was firmly established that existing rates
could be retimed or restudied by the company only where there were
changes in tools, materials, methods or products unrelated to employee
activity and effort, and a request for a contract provision to this effect was
always granted. 69 In Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp.70 the union's
request for a provision that no job be retimed for a change in method
"unless 25 per cent of the operation has been reduced" was denied and
a provision was recommended allowing the company to retime jobs where
there was an appreciable change in method. The Board's action in this
case seems to have been justified since there are no cases in which the
problem arose as to how much change was sufficient to justify retiming.
This was probably due to the fact that the procedure for establishing rates,
required by the Board, was such that there was adequate protection for the
worker from the abuse of this right by the company.7 '
67. The argument was often made where the board ordered a change in an existing
incentive plan that this was contra the Board's policy not to order installation of an
incentive plan in a dispute case. The Board rejected it on the grounds that it was not
ordering installation of an incentive plan, but only relieving inequities in an-existing
plan. See A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 21 WAR LAB. REP. 409 (1945).
68. "An incentive plan should be operated without departure from its basic framework. Production standards, base rates, timing rates, allowances, method of bonut
payment, etc. should remain the same. Management should understand that it may
not change the plan's framework in order to cut earnings or to give hidden wage
increases. Labor should understand that rates and earnings must not be increased by
improper manipulation of the plan and that rates will in some cases have to be changed
as operations change." How to Operate Incentive Plans, 13 WAR LAn. REP. XXX
(1943).
69. Servel, Inc., 24 WAR LAa. REP. 314 (1945) ; G. F. Richter Manufacturing Co.,
26 WAR LAB. REP. 362 (1945); Sheet Glass Cos., 27 WAR LAB. REP. 133 (1945) ;
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 916 (1945). Where there was
a contract provision guaranteeing existing rates from change the Board granted the
company's request for inclusion of a provision modifying this guarantee so that rates
could be changed for a change in method. Manning, Maxwell & Moore Co., 18 WAR
LAB. REP. 188 (1944).
In B. F. Goodrich Co., 13 WAR LAB. RE,. 20 (1943) the
contract called for rate of $1.05 for all drill press operators. The company, by jigs
and mechanical fixtures adjusted a limited purpose drill press operation suitable to an
amateur worker available for war emergency work. The Board allowed the company
to establish this job rate at $.945 rather than the $1.05 called for by the contract it%
view of the fact that less skill and experience was needed than for regular drill press
operation.
70. 28 WAR LAB. REP. 311 (1945).
71. Also the danger of the company's using a slight change in method as an
excuse for retiming the whole job was eliminated by providing that the rate be
changed only to the extent of the change in the method. How to Operate Incentive
Plas,13 WAR LAB. RExP. XXX (1943).
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The most obvious method of establishing new rates or adjusting existing rates would have been to establish them jointly through negotiation
between the union and the company. This method, however, would have
resulted in interminable delay and so was rejected by the Board.7 2 The
Board also rejected the argument that the establishment of incentive rates
was a managerial prerogative and not subject to challenge through contract grievance procedure. 73 The usual procedure provided for the company
to make a time study and fully discuss the results with the union and,
if possible, the parties were to agree on the new rate. If the parties were
unable to agree that the rate proposed by the company was to be put into
effect and was to be subject to challenge by the union through the contract grievance procedure, with the union or the arbitrator having the
right in such cases to have an independent time study made of the job
involved. 74 'this procedure was speedy and at the same time adequately
75
protected the rights of the worker.
The establishment of incentive rates through a grievance procedure
assumed a definite standard against which the established rates could be
tested. Since engineering standards which were used in the setting of
rates frequently were not formally recorded in the plan itself or in the
agreement covering the plan, but were embodied only in the practice and
technique of the individual plant time-study department, it became important to insure that these standards remained constant. 76 To accomplish this the Board usually granted a request, in most cases made by the
union, that the standard be recorded in the agreement. This was effected
either by ordering the parties to negotiate on the standard 77 or, in case of
disagreement, by the Board's establishing what it thought was an equitable
standard. In most cases this standard was applicable only to testing new
rates established for a new job or to a change in method on an existing
job. 78 In a few cases the union was allowed to challenge existing rates
79
for non-conformity with the standard.
Where the standard was to be used for testing new rates it was often
expressed in terms of yielding the same incentive earnings possible on the
72. Big Four Meat Packing Cos., 21 WAR LAB. RiEP. 652 (1945) ; Mather Spring
But ef. Spicer Manufacturing Co., 27 WAR LAB.
REP. 7 (1945).
73. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 25 WAR LAB. REP. 239 (1945).
74. Sheet Glass Cos., 27 WAR LAB. RFP. 133 (1945); Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass
Co., 28 WAR LA. REP. 916 (1945); Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 28 W-A
LAB. R P. 311 (1945); G. F. Richter Co., 26 WAR LAB. REP. 362 (1945); Union,
Biscuit Co., 23 WAR LAB. REP. 136 (1945) ; Micamold Radio Corp., 5 WAR LAB. RaP.
69 (1942).
75. In a few cases before the Board there was deviation from this procedure. See
American Wire Cloth Manufacturing Assn., 14 WAR LAB. REP. 197 (1944) ; Cramp
Shipbuilding Co., 17 WAR LAB. REP. 753 (Shipbuilding Comm. 1944).
76. How to Operate Incentive Plans, 13 WAR LAB. REP. XXX (1943).
77. Union Biscuit Co., 23 WAR LAB. REP. 136 (1945).
78. Micamold Radio Corp., 5 WAR LAB. REp. 69 (1942); see footnote 68 supra.
79. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Co., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 311 (1945); Murray.
Ohio Manufacturing Co., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 199 (1945); American Radiator and
Standard Sanitary Corp., 27 WAR LAB. REP. 552 (1945); J.I. Case Co., 6 WAR LAB.
RaP. 60 (1942).

Co., 23 WAR LAB. REP. 70 (1945).
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old operation for the same effort.80 The usual standard, however, was
more specific and was based on the normal production of an average worker
working at a normal rate.81 This standard of course was the only one
which could be used in testing existing rates.
The expected reward for standard production was usually set 20 to 30
per cent above the hourly or day rate for the job.82 Industry practice
seemed to be the determining factor as to the particular percentage
ordered.83 At first glance it would appear that for standard production
the ivorker should get his hourly rate. Reward above the hourly rate for
standard production is common practice and is recognized by authorities
on incentive plans. 84 Justification is found for this practice in that abovestandard work requires greater effort and efficiency than is found in the
case of day workers where the poorest workers tend to establish the
amount of output.,Adjustment of Incentive Plans under the Little Steel Formula.Under the "Little Steel Formula," the keystone of war-time wage policy,
the general wage rate increases which could be granted to employees as
a cost of living adjustment were limited to 15% of their straight-time
average hourly earnings in January, 1941. In applying this formula to the
facts of individual cases before it, the Board ran into great difficulty resulting in many confused and contradictory decisions. This confusion in
many cases was due to the failure to recognize the basic principles involved
in all incentive plans and their application in different types of plans. The
main reason for the Board's difficulty was that it alloived itself to get
side-tracked in its attempt to determine the allowable increase in terms
of cents per hour over the present hourly earnings (without regard to the
incentive system of arriving at those earnings) rather than in terms of the
incentive rate. In doing this of course the Board had to take into account
raises given subsequent to the base period and charge them against the
allowable increase. More often than not these subsequent raises had been
80. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Co., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 311 (1945).
81. "This normal pace should not be the base of the fastest worker; it should
represent the average, unrestricted performance of the average worker. It should
represent the performance of the average worker working efficiently at a job which
has been subjected to adequate motion study; it should not represent the performance
of an untrained or inefficient worker on a job which will require weeks for the development of coordinated effort." Campbell, Wyant and Cannon Foundry Co., 14 WAx
LAB. RP: 383, 387 (1944).
82. Phelps Dodge Copper Products, 28 WAR LAB. RaP. 311 (1945) (20 per cent) ;
Murray Ohio Manufacturing Co., 28 WAR LAB. RaP. 199 (1945) (20 per cent);
American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 27 WAR LAB. REP. 552 (1945)
(30 per cent); Bates Manufacturing Co., 22 WAR LAB. REP. 460 (1945) (Ordered
reconsideration by Regional Board of its denial of union request for 25 per cent
standard); J. I. Case Co., 6 WAR LAD. Rap. 60 (1942) (Standard ordered was 12
cents above base rate) ; Micamold Radio Corp., 5 WAR LAB. RP. 69 (1942) (25 per
cent above base rate).
83. J. I. Case Co., 6 WAR LAn. REP. 60, 68 (1942).
84. BARxES, INDUsTRIAL ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT 186 et seq. (1st ed.
1931); LOUDEN, WAGE INCENTIVES (1st ed. 1947).
85. LOUDEN, op. cit. supra note 84.
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given, withoub consideration to incentive principles, in the term of a flat
increase of a certain number of cents per hour to be added to total earnings under the incentive plan.
In J. I. Case Company 86 the Board, even though it did it in an
extremely abstruse fashion, at least realized that the solution lay in increasing the base rate rather than by making additions in the form of flat
payments after the computation of hourly earnings under the incentive plan.
In later cases even this general incentive principle was lost in the confusion and increases were ordered as flat payments 87 and even as additions
to the minimum guaranteed rate. 88 The latter method is obviously fallacious
since the minimum guaranteed rate is significant only where the worker
fails to make standard production and so has no effect on the earnings of
the worker producing at standard production.8 9
"Special Rate" Provisions.-Incentive plans commonly provide for special compensation for incentive workers for loss of incentive earnings due
to such factors as waiting time resulting from machinery breakdown or
lack of materials, use of substituted or inferior material, or temporary transfer to non-incentive jobs. Whether a special rate should be paid a worker
for time not under incentive depended generally on the type of work he was
assigned to, and the reason for his transfer. Where the worker was
transferred to other work for the convenience of the company provision was
usually made for payment to him of his average incentive earnings." This
has included sample work, experimental work, short production jobs where
no time value has been established, instruction work, or transfer to fill a
vacancy. A company's usual contention against paying average incentive
earnings for this type of work was that incentive earnings should only be
given where it could be shown the extra effort had been exerted. The
Board justified a special rate in these situations since the company was
utilizing the worker's special skill or ability by a change made for the
convenience of the company.
Average incentive earnings were also guaranteed where the worker
produced less because of substituted or faulty materials. 91 This seems fair
since extra effort could be cancelled by the handicap of faulty materials.
The worker was paid at his base rate for time lost because of lack of
86. 6 WAR LAz. REP. 60 (1942).
87. Phelps Dodge Copper Products, 28 WA LAB. REP. 311 (1945); Worthington
Pump & Machinery Corp., 18 WA LAB. REP. 385 (1944).
88. Buffalo Bolt Co., 7 WAR LAB. REP. 559 (1943).
89. For example, if the base rate is $1.00 and standard production is 20% above
the base rate, at standard production the worker makes $1.20. The minimum guarantect
is usually equal to the base rate. If the minimum guaranted is increased by 15% to
$1.15, and no change is made in the base rate, the earnings of the worker at standard
production are unchanged.
90. McQuay-Norris Mfg. Co., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 211 (1945);

Copper Products Co., 28

LAB. REP. 631 (1943).

WAR LAB.

REP.

Phelps Dodge

311 (1945) ; Borg-Warner Corp., 10 WAR

Contra: J. I. Case Co., 6 WAR LAB. REr. 60 (1942).

91. Utica & Mohawk Cotton Mills, Inc., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 25 (1945); Phelps
Dodge Copper Products Co., supra note 90; A. & M. Karagheusian Co., 28 WAR LAB.
REP. 473 (1945) ; Borg-Warner Corp., supra note 90. Contra: J. I. Case Co., supra.
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materials or transfer to a day-rated job because there was insufficient piecework for him at his regular operation. 92 There was disagreement in the
Board's decisions on what payment should be made for time lost because
of machinery breakdowns. The tendency was to allow the worker his
average incentive earnings. 93 A company's main argument against this
was that it resulted in the worker's being careless with the machinery since
he would be protected in case of breakdown. This argument was counterbalanced by the fact that management, being responsible for assigning
mechanics to keep machinery in repair, was as often responsible. In such
a situation the worker is not exerting extra effort and is not doing a job
for the company's convenience and it is difficult to justify treating it differently than where time is lost through lack of materials or work.
Minimum Guarantee.-Often through no fault of his own an incentive
worker fails to achieve standard production. To protect him in this situation from disparately low earnings it is common for incentive plans to
provide for a guaranteed minimum wage which is equal to his day rate.
The Board always granted a request for such a provision, even where long
established industry practice of not providing a minimum guarantee was
shown. 94
While it was well settled that a minimum guarantee should be given,
the Board was unsure as to the method of applying it--on a weekly or
daily basis. Whether the guarantee is applied on a daily or weekly basis
can make a significant difference in the worker's earnings. In operation,
if a worker has exceeded his standard on the first three days of the week
but fails to make up to standard on the last three days of the week, under
a daily guarantee, he is paid incentive earnings for the first three days
of the week and the guaranteed minimum for the remaining days. Under
a weekly guarantee his earnings are computed on the basis of a weekly
standard so that in the same situation he would not get incentive earnings on his above standard production on the first three days, his excess
on these days being balanced against his failure to make standard production on the last three days. The main arguments advanced against the
weekly basis were, first, that it reduced the incentive value of any plan
in that a worker who had failed to make standard in the beginning of the
week would not exert himself at the end of the week if he knew that any
production over standard would be balanced against his below-standard
production before he received credit for it; 95 and, second, that a weekly
92. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Co., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 311 (1945); BorgWarner Corp., 10 WAR LAB. REIP. 631 (1943).
93. Utica & Mohawk Cotton Mills, Inc., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 25 (1945) ; A. & M.
Karagheusian Co., 28 WAR LAB. REP. 473 (1945) ; Borg-Warner Corp., supra note 92.
Contra: Phelps Dodge Copper Products Co., supra note 92; J. I. Case Co., 6 WAR
LAB. REP. 60 (1943).
94. See Bates Manufacturing Co., 22 WA LAB. REP. 460 (1945).
95. It was also argued that a worker would not work hard in the beginning of
the week since it was possible that these incentive earnings would be cancelled out if he

failed to make standard production at the end of the week.
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guarantee resulted in dissatisfaction among the workers since it made it impossible for them to know how much they had earned at the end of each
day. 6 An argument in support of the weekly guarantee advanced by
management was the increased cost of administration necessarily involved
in the computation of a worker's production on a daily rather than a
weekly basis. This argument was rejected by the Board on the grounds
that the increase in production resulting from the increased incentive under
97
a daily guarantee more than offset its cost.
Another objection of management was the possibility of abuse under
a daily guarantee through the practice of "banking" by the workers. "Banking" is accomplished by a worker's withholding part of a day's production,
getting the daily guarantee for that day, and turning in this production on
the subsequent day for incentive credit. In a few decisions involving the
shipping industry, where the practice was found to be prevalent, the
Board denied the union's request for a daily guarantee.98 In the Carborundum Co.9 9 case, however, the Board rejected this argument on the
grounds that the possibility of this abuse could be eliminated through closer
supervision.
Discontinuance of an Existing Incentive Plan.-In many dispute cases
the Board was requested by one of the parties to eliminate an existing incentive plan. Despite the fact that Executive orders 9250 and 9328 and the
Public Debt Act of 1943 took away the Board's authority to approve a
decrease in wages below the level of the highest wages paid between January 1, 1942 and September 15, 1942, which usually resulted where an incentive plan was eliminated, the Board's power to order elimination was
firmly established.' 0 0 In view of the vital need' for increased production
made possible through incentive plans and because its elimination involved
a radical change, especially where the plan had been in existence for a long
time,' 0 ' elimination was ordered only as a last resort where the plan was
found to be "unworkable beyond reform." 102
96. "Any wage-rate structure which makes it impossible for an American workman to answer the simple question, 'How much do you receive a day for your work?'
is inherently an undesirable wage-rate system." Little Steel Companies, 1 WAR LAB.
REP. 325, 348 (1942). See also McKay Co., 6 WAR LAB. REP. 380 (1943) ; Big Four
Meat Packing Cos., 21 WAR LAB. Rp. 652 (1945).
97. Carborundum Co., 24 WAR LAB. RE'. 237 and 729 (1945).
98. Cramp Shipbuilding Co., 17 WAR L.ka. REP. 753 (Shipbuilding Commission,
1944); Federal Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 21 WAR LAB. RaE'. 121 (Shipbuilding
Commission, 1945).
99. 24 WAR LAB. REP. 237 and 729 (Regional Board II, 1945).
100. American Brake Shoe Co., 21 WAR LA. RP. 497 (1945); Baldwin Locomotive Works, 19 WAR LAB. RP. 460 (1944); Jones & Lamson Machine Co., 14
WAR LAB. REP. 1-21 (1944); Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 12 WAR LAB. Rap. 110
(1943).
101. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co., 14 WAR LAB. RaP. 380 (1944);
Cramp Shipbuilding Co., 17 WAR LAB. RaP. 753 (Shipbuilding Commission, 1944);
Diamond Match Co., 18 WAR LAB. REP. 745 (1944).
102. Standard Register Co., 21 WAR LAB. REP. 745 (1945). Cramp Shipbuilding
Co., 17 WAR LAB. RaP. 753 (Shipbuilding Commission, 1944), well illustrates the
reluctance of the Board to order elimination.
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The Anaconda Copper Co.'0 3 case and the American Brake Shoe
Co. ' case both illustrate a type of situation which the Board felt did not
lend itself to mere modification. In both these cases dissatisfaction and
unrest among the workers was caused by the fact that their production was
seriously affected by the incompetence of the auxiliary workers servicing
their machines. In Jones & Lamson Machine Co.1 5 a plant-wide plan
based on dollar volume was ordered eliminated. Because of a change in
production from machine parts to airplane assemblies, it was felt that an
incentive plan was no longer necessary to increase production.
Another factor which played an important part in the Board's determination was whether or not the company or the union was asking for
the discontinuance. Where elimination would result in a decrease in wages,
it was usually opposed by the union and discontinuance would inevitably
result in creating a great deal of dissatisfaction and unrest among the
work force with resulting work stoppages. In the Cramp Shipbuilding
Co.10 6 case it was pointed out that this decrease in earnings might result
in the labor force's moving to higher paid jobs in the area. Since this
consideration was absent where both parties joined in the request the
10 7
Board was more prone to order elimination in such a case.
10

CONCLUSION
The present Wage Stabilization Board was set up as part of the
Economic Stabilization Agency by Executive Order, No. 10,161 of September 9, 1950 108 under the au.thority of the Defense Production Act of
1950.109 On April 24, 1951, the former order was amended so as to
reconstitute the Board as an eighteen man tripartite group and to give it
jurisdiction over labor disputes submitted to it by the parties for recommendations or decision or referred to it by the President for recommendations." 0 The Board has only recently undertaken to regulate incentive plans as a part of the stabilization program. The President declared a state of national emergency on December 16, 1950 111 and the
Economic Stabilization Agency issued a price-freeze order on January 26,
1951. Since the Defense Production Act provides that any area of the
economy which is subject to price control must also be subject to wage
103. 12 WAR LAB. REP. 110
104. 21 WAR LAB. REP. 497
105. 14 WAR LAB. REP. 121
106. 17 WAR LAB. RzE. 753

(1943).

(1945).'

(1944).

(1944).
107. See Baldwin Locomotive Works, 21 WAR L.a. REP. 900 (1944); Wood
Bros, Thresher Co., 23 WAR LAB. REP. 738 (1945).
108. 50 U.S.C.A. App. §2071 note (1951).

109. 64 STAT. 798 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 2071 et seq. (1951).
110. Exec. Ord. No. 10233, 16 FED. REG. 3503 (1951).
111. Prod. 2919, 50 U.S.C.A. App. procl. § 1 (1951).
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control, 112 General Wage Sfabilization Regulation 1 was issued on January 30, 1951, freezing wages and prohibiting increases without the approval of the Board. 118
General Wage Regulation 15, issued on August 6, 1951, contains the
present rules of the Board with respect to incentive plans, but is intended
only as an interim statement to be amplified later. 114 It provides that
Board approval is not needed for a plan: where there is an extension of
an existing plan to new items or other jobs in the plant; where there is
a change in method, tools, etc., resulting in a change of rates; or where
a change in existing rates results in earnings which reflect the same percentage over day or base rates as when the existing rate was originally
adopted. It further provides that criteria, of new or changed rates shall
be (1) the application of engineering or rate setting principles where the
rates are set by time study or standard data; or (2) the maintaining of
the established relationship between earnings and job content where the
rates are set by estimate or negotiation. Adjustments made by employers
without Board approval must on request be shown to be in accord with
these principles.
Incentive plans have an important role in the defense effort and are
accordingly a major problem of wage stabilization." 5 Of course, the consideration here of incentive plans as a stabilization matter is subject to the
limitation that they have an impact in the larger area of an integrated
national economy which must be constantly kept in mind by labor, manageThe problems they raise which will
ment and stabilization authoritles. 1
have to be met by the contemporary economic stabilization program will be
similar to, and in many respects identical with, those faced by the NWLB
in World War II. The decisions of the old Board (most of which have
been compiled in the twenty-eight volumes of War Labor Reports) will be
valuable precedents and guide-postsoin seeking current solutions eiren though
they must be adapted to an economic context different from that of the
World War II period.
112. §402(b), 50 U.S.C.A. App. §2102 (1951).
113. 16 FED. REG. 816 (1951).
114. 16 FED. REG. 1236 (1951).

115. Daugherty, Wage Stabilization Standards in STANDARDS OF PRICE AND WAGE
STAIuzATiox, 12 OHio ST. L.J. 96, 103 (1951).

116. Wallen, Wage Incentive Under Stabilisation in N.Y.U. FOURTH AxwuAL
CONFERamNcE oN LABOR (1951). A short but valuable sketch of some of the appropriate considerations in dealing with wage incentives, provided by a former Chairman

of the NWLB.
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